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Abstract 
In addressing the persistent challenge of fully integrating individual dimensions and human 
subjectivity within the cultural-historical activity theory, this paper suggests several steps to revise 
its core onto-epistemology in an expansive approach termed the transformative activist stance. 
This approach outlines the subtle dialectics of individual and collective planes of human praxis 
whereby each individual is shaped by collective history and collaborative practices while at the 
same time shaping and real-izing them through contributing to their collective, dynamic 
materiality in moving beyond the status quo. In capitalizing on people always transcending what 
exists in ‘the here and now,’ in a non-adaptive fashion, based in a commitment and vision to how 
the world “ought to be,” the individual subjectivity is reclaimed as itself a fully social, embodied, 
material-discursive process. Individual subjectivity and agency gain status through contributing to 
changes in “collectividual” practices as the primary onto-epistemology of a unitary realm that is 
individual and social/collective at the same time. 
 
Introduction 
Cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) is currently enjoying much popularity and 
success in a variety of fields and disciplines ranging from organizational and human-
computer interactions studies to research on self-regulation, second language acquisition 
and literacy, among many others. This theory has launched a number of theoretical 
breakthroughs (not yet fully explored) that are in close unison with directions that are now 
spearheading no less than a conceptual revolution such as dynamic systems theory, 
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developmental systems approach, participatory learning, embodied, dynamic, enacted and 
situated cognition, and developmental epigenetics, among others. All of these causes for 
celebration notwithstanding, it is important to continue to expansively critique and 
interrogate this theory’s basic tenets and propositions. Theories are kept alive by 
continuously revisiting and re-figuring their grounds in what can be called “a critique from 
within” (Stetsenko, 1990/1995) – a type of analysis meant to advance, rather than refute, a 
given theory through working out contradictions within its ever-evolving zones of 
proximal development that result from its dynamics within the shifting social contexts of 
which it partakes (see also Langemeyer, 2006). Paraphrasing a famous saying, one can say 
that if there had not been any controversies in the CHAT, they would have to be invented 
just to keep it alive. No less significantly, self-reflection is needed to address possible 
liabilities of the CHAT’s entanglement with the historical-political dynamics, including 
during the recent tumultuous decades, to avoid the risk of being blind to the issues of 
context, power, and social change.  
This strategy of critically interrogating, revisiting, and reconfiguring broad theoretical 
premises of CHAT does not signify a move away from practical and empirical 
investigations but instead, can be seen as inherently a part of such investigations. Success 
of CHAT has always been associated with its authors’ deep engagement with theoretical 
and philosophical issues and its most remarkable practical applications directly resulted 
from such an engagement. These include developmental programs for children with 
disabilities (works by Mesheryakov and Sokolyansky, for overview, see Bakhurst & 
Padden, 1991) and educational programs (Davydov, e.g., 1988, 1995; for overview, see 
Arievitch & Stetsenko, 2000). It is no accident that the authors of these educational 
programs were primarily committed to developing very broad, philosophical 
conceptualizations of human development. For example, Vassily V. Davydov’s works 
have been marked by his deep grasp of the Hegelian-Marxist legacy and supported by his 
close collaboration with philosophers such as E.V. Ilyenkov. These works stand as a direct 
example of realizing the credo shared by Vygotsky and other CHAT founders – the 
conviction about the deeply practical nature of theory, the capacity of the seemingly 
abstract theorizing to shape and even determine solutions for the utmost practical 
problems, and at a deeper level, about inseparability of theoretical and practical 
dimensions of all human activities and endeavors.  
In this spirit, I undertake a critical revision of some of the grounding, worldview-level 
assumptions of CHAT in their implications for understanding human subjectivity – with 
the goal to delineate contradictions in this approach that can serve as the growing points 
for its further advances and developments. These contradictions are related to gaps in 
defining the ontological status of human subjectivity, including the mind and its 
constituents such as concepts, and the resulting tensions in fully integrating psychological 
processes and individual levels of activity more broadly. These tensions are important to 
address especially given the present socio-political climate of acute global crisis and rapid 
social changes, in order to do full justice to the notions of transformation and activism in 
accounts of human development. These conceptual gaps can be discerned in Davydov’s 
approach and CHAT in general and, moreover (as I will illustrate in the following 
sections), they still reverberate in today’s literature and research.  Addressing these 
controversies might help to expansively advance CHAT so that its explanatory power and 
practical import are strengthened by drawing together potential allies working in 
directions close to CHAT such as critical pedagogy and participatory action research, 
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among others. This can also help repair some rifts that have occurred within CHAT 
splitting it into somewhat separate research directions – hardly to the advantage of either 
one of them, especially given the relentless march of alternative, starkly biologically 
reductionist approaches.  
The argument developed in this paper is that it is possible to understand human 
subjectivity while remaining true to the major dialectical, non-dualist tenets and 
presuppositions. This can be done if subjectivity is not understood as some inherently 
private, self-sufficient realm that is ontologically distinct from collaborative activities out 
in the world. The suggested alternative is to explain individual subjectivity in terms of 
manifest and inherently collaborative processes of individuals acting as social subjects 
(even while they engage, as they often do, in their own, seemingly withdrawn and private 
pursuits) – that is, as members of community practices and agents of communal history 
who enact collectivities by changing them through their own, individually unique 
contributions instantiated in each and every act of knowing, being, and doing.  
In this rendition, the difficult problem of theorizing individual processes, traditionally 
termed mental, is integrated as a legitimate task within the overall project of developing a 
fully dialectical view of human development. This includes conceptualizing the subtle 
dialectics of individual and collective planes of human praxis whereby each individual – 
in all expressions including psychological phenomena -- is revealed as constituted by, 
embodying, participating, and most importantly, contributing to the dynamic materiality 
of collective history and collaborative practices.  The critical task is to understand and 
explain even the seemingly solipsistic endeavors, such as apparently solo or “inner” 
processes of thinking and concept formation, within the non-dualistic framework, while 
revealing them as in fact never just solipsistic or inner. This strategy substitutes for 
theories which, rather than explaining the processes of human subjectivity, de facto 
explain them away -- as if any account of their status and development must automatically 
imply Cartesian dualism.  Rather than resolving traditional dualisms by simply wiping out 
one of its constituent parts, the approach suggested herein is undertaken in the spirit of  
reclaiming traditional notions such as individual concepts, and processes such as 
internalization and authoring, that are otherwise left under the purview of outdated 
approaches that unduly psychologize, individualize, and mentalize them.  
The Challenge of Individuality within the CHAT Research 
The hallmark of CHAT is that it takes social practice, defined as human goal-directed 
collective activity, as the core grounding for human development and learning and does so 
for multiple reasons, including those derived from research into phylogenesis and 
ontogenesis. Although many practice theories have proliferated in social sciences taking 
root from diverse sources (such as, in addition to Marx, the philosophies of Max Weber, 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein, see e.g., Bourdieu, Giddens, Foucault, Garfinkel, and others), 
the works of Vygotsky (e.g., 1997, 1998a,b) and his school remain the true staple of this 
approach, directly continuing the legacy of Marxist philosophy and deserving a status of a 
pioneering perspective (cf. Langemeyer, 2006). According to this approach, humans come 
to be and come to know – each other, themselves and the world – while jointly enacting 
collective practices mediated by cultural tools (starting with the tools of labor, all the way to 
complex symbolic systems such as language), building on efforts of each other and on 
achievements of previous generations, while cumulatively expanding on and amplifying 
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these achievements. Therefore, human activity -- material, practical and always by necessity 
social, collective processes reliant on and mediated by cultural tools – is seen as the basic 
form of human social life that is formative of everything that is human in humans, including 
their subjectivity and its forms such as the mind, knowledge, concepts, and personhood. 
These subjective (psychological) phenomena are understood as related to human 
collaborative practices/activities and evolving in their midst. 
One of the most significant elaborations of this theory, as already mentioned, was Vassily 
V. Davydov’s works (e.g., 1988, 1995) which deserve a critical scrutiny precisely because 
of their strengths. In continuing activity theory, Davydov maintained that in the acts of 
labor, people move beyond the “natural” immediacy of the world and instead, discern events 
and objects in their interrelations which are critical to human collective practices and which 
otherwise remain hidden. It is because people engage in practical transformations of their 
world and accumulate their experiences and discoveries across generations, in forms of 
universal practice of humanity as a whole, that the systemic relations among phenomena and 
processes gradually become revealed and reflected in concepts. The collective practice of 
humanity -- social both in its genetic roots and methods -- was thus posited as the 
foundation that gives rise to thinking including its theoretical forms that grasp reality in its 
essential, that is, abstract yet at the same time practical characteristics (a point that will be 
discussed in more detail in the last section of this paper).  
However, in terms of ontological specifications of how psychological processes exist, 
Davydov (1988) seems to acknowledge (following Ilyenkov) two realms, or two modes of 
existence  – that of ideal phenomena of a collective nature embodying collaborative 
discoveries of humanity, and that of individual concepts developed when persons acquire 
collective concepts. The link between these two realms, according to Davydov, consists in 
individuals acquiring cultural forms of knowledge as tools of socio-historical practices that 
lie ‘behind’ each concept. This process of cultural knowledge acquisition was posited to 
take place within the practical, culturally mediated, and socially situated activities. 
However, the relationship between material activity and psychological processes was further 
specified, unfortunately, only by stating that the two are somehow intertwined, yet without 
much exploration into how exactly this is possible and how the two realms are ontologically 
commensurate. Without such a specification, it is no wonder that the mental processes 
essentially became equated with the rather traditionally understood process of reflection 
(otrazhenie –[Russian]) which, although posited as stemming from and existing in the 
context of activity, is nonetheless not much different from the connotation of an internal 
display of images in individual consciousness. The first step in the development of the mind, 
for example, was seen by Davydov (1988) as the forming of representations, whereby a 
sensuous image of a class of objects is separated within practical activity from the objects 
themselves due to the work of imagination (“voobrazhenie” - Russian), with these images 
then generalized by linguistic means. This analytical solution, however, left many gaps in 
place especially in that it did not challenge traditional notions that psychological processes 
serve to ‘reflect’ reality. The old mental connotation, although challenged by a focus on 
psychological processes originating in practical activities, their reliance on cultural tools, 
and their embedding within situated activities, was in significant ways left in place. 
Similar tensions and gaps continued into later works affiliated with Vygotsky’s and activity 
theory approaches (for examples, see Stetsenko, 1995). Because there is no space to review 
all the forms that these tensions and gaps have taken across the years, it is useful to turn for 
illustrations to a recent chapter by Vladislav A. Lektorsky (2009), the leading authority in 
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this field in the present day Russia. In his well informed and thoughtful overview of recent 
trends and debates in philosophy and psychology, Lektorsky essentially reproduces the dual 
view that typified the original approach of CHAT. Admitting that the opposition between 
the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ worlds, between the “immediately given” and mediated 
phenomena, remains a problem, Lektorsky goes on to present his interpretation of activity 
theory:   
From the point of view of activity theory, consciousness and “the inner” are social and 
cultural constructions and exist first of all in forms of collective activity. …The subject 
as the unity of consciousness, the unity of an individual biography, and the center of 
making decisions can exist only as the center of “the inner world.” But the appearance 
of “the inner world” is possible only when the idea of “the inner” arises in culture, in 
other words, when it is realized in forms of collective activity. (p. 80) …The “we” 
feeling exists only in the minds of individual subjects, participating in a certain kind of 
activity. (p. 82) In reality, the “inner space” of consciousness is a result of individual 
appropriation of certain kinds of external collective activity. So we may say that the so-
called inner space first exists in outer, external actions as a part of collective activity. 
Internalization is impossible without participation in external mediated activity. (p. 83) 
 
This account essentially re-states the core (and the now ‘classical’ or canonical, cf. Sawchuk 
& Stetsenko, 2008) tenet of CHAT that human consciousness is a result of individuals 
appropriating external collective activity in the course of participating in it and that the inner 
space first exists in the outer, collective activity. This position does not move beyond the 
insights of the early works of activity theorists (certainly progressive for their time in the 
early to the mid-20th century) and de facto leaves the same conundrums unresolved which is 
especially unfortunate given that many decades have passed since this theory’s conception. 
This position, to reiterate, does not theorize, nor show in any sufficient detail how to 
reconcile the ‘inner space’ (the psychological realm) with the notion of collective activities, 
leaving its ontological status ambiguous and uncertain.  
Transformative Activist Stance 
Several steps to resolve the difficult problems outlined in the previous section have been 
suggested in what I have termed the transformative activist stance. To recapitulate the logic 
of this approach, my efforts have been focused, first, on explicating the general Marxist 
foundation that was, albeit in a nascent form, at the core of both Vygotsky’s and his 
immediate followers’ approaches, while also revealing differences between their respective 
foci – in contradistinction to positions (e.g., see works by Kozulin and van der Ver & 
Valsiner) that separate the works by these scholars into independent, and even contradictory, 
research directions (for details, see Stetsenko, 2004, Stetsenko & Arievitch, 2004a). 
Explicating the general foundation present in the works by the founders of activity theory, 
and the differences among their positions (often obscured in interpretations that focus on 
more specific topics such as cultural mediation), is presented as the three-fold dialectics of 
human social practices (see Stetsenko, 2005; for further explication, see Sawchuk & 
Stetsenko, 2008). This dialectics is revealed to be comprised of the following three layers or 
dimensions – the practical processes of materially producing conditions of existence reliant 
on employment of tools (i.e., human labor); the intersubjective processes of social 
communication that organize, structure, and coordinate these practical processes; and the 
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processes of human subjectivity, inclusive of cognition, the self and agency, that allow 
individuals to be full participants within the processes of materially producing their lives 
while socially interacting and interchanging with others. These three layers or dimensions 
are posited as all belonging to, and together comprising, one unified and dynamic realm of 
social practices -- the complex system of human collaborative praxis (Stetsenko, 2005). 
An additional specification (Stetsenko, 2008, 2010a, 2012, 2013) consists in expanding and 
accentuating this general foundation unifying works by the CHAT founders through 
highlighting the ontological status of collaborative praxis as the primary realm (or the 
‘fabric’) of human life and development, including its interrelated aspects of knowing, being 
and becoming. This specification puts the emphasis on the ontological primacy of 
collaborative praxis as a way of life or existence (Lebensweise [German]; способ 
существования [Russian]) unique to humans that constitutes the foundation for their 
development in all of its expressions, dimensions, and facets including phenomena of the 
self, the mind, and cognition. An important analytical strategy used in laying out this 
position – in preparing the next step towards the transformative activist stance – consists in 
addressing how the CHAT is in fact built on fully relational and situated premises in an 
acknowledgement that people are inextricably embedded in their world and constituted by 
relations with it, including relations with other people and the whole of humanity. This 
allows for a meaningful comparison of CHAT with equally relational approaches that posit 
social interactions and bonds, sometimes understood as dialogicality or discourse, at the 
core of development. For example, according to Markova’s (2012) recent explication, 
…interdependence among minds, rather than their isolation, is deeply rooted in the 
human nature and it permeates all fundamental faculties like cognizing, acquiring 
knowledge and believing, imagining, feeling and acting. Sociality is so basic that it 
defines the human existence: we can call it dialogical ontology. (p. 211; emphasis 
added). 
 
My suggestion has been to acknowledge that this dialogical perspective is compatible with 
CHAT at one, though not all (!), conceptual levels in theorizing human development and 
social practices. Since human beings come to be and develop in and through the dynamics 
of their way of life that relates them to their world including other people, the primary 
ontology of development is indeed fully relational and dialogical. What the transformative 
activist stance highlights at another level, however, in continuation of Vygotsky and 
Leontiev’s legacy, is that the dialogical ontology and other relational ontologies, such as 
those that prioritize discourses, experiences and participation, are superseded by a unified 
(indivisible though not homogenous) ontology of collaborative praxis in its materiality and 
historicity. It is an explicit materiality, collectivity, and historicity of human collaborative 
practices that make them more suited for the status of originary and primary onto-
epistemology than is dialogical ontology. The embodied enactment of social life in and 
through uninterrupted collaborative practical activities of humanity unfolding in history is 
ontologically and epistemologically primary and supreme vis-à-vis dialogical relations, 
discourses, and experiences -- essentially superseding them. The term ‘superseding,’ used in 
a dialectical sense, denotes a conceptual move that does not eliminate a given phenomenon 
or its properties but instead, lifts them up and includes them, albeit in a subordinate role, 
into a new systemic whole comprised, in this case, by human collaborative practices. That 
is, these practices are fully dialogical and relational, yet what makes them what they are, 
their formative feature and character cannot be reduced to dialogicality only. Instead, their 
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formative feature has to do with people collectively and materially producing the conditions 
of their existence, while along the way necessarily interacting, dialoguing, relating, as well 
as and coming to develop specifically human psychological processes, agency, and 
subjectivity.  
My further, and most critical, suggestion has been to emphasize the transformative nature of 
collaborative practices, in their status of the primary onto-epistemology of human 
development, as their key formative feature, thus more explicitly integrating notions of 
social change and activism into the most basic descriptions of the very reality of human 
development and social dynamics. The resulting transformative ontology of human praxis 
suggests that it is directly through and in the process (rather than in addition to) of people 
constantly transforming and creating their social world and thus moving beyond the status 
quo that people simultaneously create and constantly transform their very life, therefore also 
changing themselves in fundamental ways while, in the process, becoming individually 
unique and gaining knowledge about themselves and the world. Although the theme of 
people transforming their world and being transformed by it is common to many works in 
Vygotsky’s and other Marxist and social practice frameworks, its ontological and 
epistemological significance and profound implications for practically all aspects in 
accounting for social life and human development have not been fully explored, nor 
sufficiently absorbed, often resulting in this radical premise being coupled with old-
fashioned ideas and views.  
The analytical import of taking transformative social change as the core characteristic of 
human social practices, first suggested (though not fully explicated) by Marx, is actually 
enormous, implying a conceptual shift in theorizing human development and society that is 
no less radical than the import of Darwin’s revolution in biological sciences (see Stetsenko, 
2010a, 2011). Whereas Darwin introduced the notion of change into what had been a static 
thinking about nature as fixed and inert, the Marxist philosophical-conceptual innovation 
consisted in overturning traditional, and similarly static, modes of thinking about not only 
nature but human development and society as well. 
What these traditional modes of thinking about society and human development were tacitly 
based on during the time of Darwin and Marx, and what they continue to be based on today, 
is the assumption about the superiority of the socio-political and cultural status quo present 
at a given time and place as a somehow static and fixed, immutable and unchanging “given” 
that can be taken for granted in way of an essentialist reification. Similarly to the Darwinian 
insight, yet also moving beyond it, the conceptual and analytical shift implied by 
transformative onto-epistemology presupposes a kind of a ‘mindquake’ – a profound change 
in the habitual mode of thinking whereby the processes such as social practices and their 
products are not reified at any analytical step in their descriptions and analysis. Instead, the 
very mode of existence of social practices and their products is taken to be characterized as 
the dynamics of ever-shifting and moving, continuously re-structuring and re-organizing 
movement and flow of ceaseless changes, transformations, transmutations, and re-
assemblages. In this perspective, the changes and transformations in social communal praxis 
is what exists and what substitutes for the world in its fixity and “givenness.” The change, in 
other words, is ontologically primary, whereas stability and static forms, structures, and 
patterns are derivative of what is the primary reality comprised of ubiquitous and ceaseless 
changes and transformations in the ever unfolding and dynamic communal praxis. This is a 
radical shift away from the current ideals of science that are still based in essentialist 
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substance ontologies, holding variation and change as anomalies to be eliminated in 
grasping some presumably static essences and their a-historical, “universal laws.”  
In my interpretation, it is the simultaneity and the unity of human transformative practice on 
the one hand, and the process of knowing and becoming, on the other, that needs to be 
addressed more centrally. Perhaps the most striking implication is the emphasis on the non-
adaptive nature of human development as always moving beyond the ‘given,’ always 
transcending the status quo of the world as it exists in ‘the here and now.’ That is, knowing, 
being, and doing are understood to be ontologically determined by (though not reduced to) 
acts of transformation that contribute to social communal praxis in the connotation of 
creating novelty and moving beyond the given in transcending its status quo. This position 
contrasts with “situationist” and “contextualist” explanations focused on development as a 
passive processes of people being situated in their context or environment (as that which 
simply surrounds them), that is, as merely dwelling in, or experiencing, the world as in the 
metaphor of ‘being there’ (see Clark, 1997) and many works in distributed, sociocultural, 
and situated cognition theories, including those that follow with the Heideggerian notion of 
Dasein.  
The point that transformative onto-epistemology brings across is that development is not a 
process that somehow happens to people so that they can and sometimes also do transform 
conditions of their existence, for example, through ostensibly supplementary efforts that are 
carried out in addition to development. Instead, the radical implication of the transformative 
onto-epistemology is that it is in the process, and as the process of instigating changes in 
social practices that human development takes place, whereby these changes constitute the 
core reality of development, the stuff (or the fabric) that the development is made up from. 
This interpretation of the materialist, Marxist dialectics permeating works within the CHAT 
founding tradition (albeit implicitly), stresses that social practices and activity systems refer 
not just to doing certain things to obtain specific results, but to creating new forms of reality 
through the process of reframing and re-fabricating ongoing activities and social structures 
and therefore, of moving beyond them in creative acts of doing, being, and knowing. These 
creative acts (as all human acts essentially are) do not just take place in the world as in the 
notion of situated and embedded cognition and development; rather, these acts of being, 
knowing and doing bring forth the world, the reality itself, essentially creating the world in 
its continuous becoming and historicity.  
Importantly, the social world itself is posited in TAS (Transformative activist stance) as 
constituted by and through social transformative practices enacted and carried out by 
individuals acting collaboratively as social subjects – thus also emphasizing transformations 
and changes in the immediately present reality as its core ontology, rather than this reality 
beings a metaphysical ‘given’ that exists independently of social praxis in its enactment by 
people and, thus, independently of human presence (as was often assumed in ‘canonical’ 
Marxism and, by extension, in the founding works by the CHAT scholars). The world, in 
other words, is understood as being always in the process of change, as a constantly shifting 
and moving terrain where there are no separate entities but a continuous flow of ever 
changing processes. Moreover, because it is composed of human acts and deeds, the world 
can be conceptualized as a shifting and moving collective forum of human deeds. In other 
words, the world is understood in its human relevance – as a dynamic uninterrupted flow of 
actionable social practices carried out in the form of human deeds stretching through time, 
thus effectively comprising history as a continuum brought into existence and enacted by 
people. Thus understood, the world does not exist separately from human beings and cannot 
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be described apart from them, in isolation from what people actually do and perform in their 
lives, with human actions constituting no less than the lived world itself (Bakhtin, 1990, 
1993; see Stetsenko, 2007). At the center stage, eliminating the polarity of human beings 
and the world, is a unified process of people transforming their circumstances of life and 
simultaneously, in this very process, being transformed by their own transformative 
practices. This conceptual move takes into account that the sheer ‘givenness’ of reality or 
matter is superseded through the imposition of a purposive human activity that is made up 
of the ever-changing dynamics of transformative efforts and struggles. Therefore, the world 
itself, since it is understood to be made up from and by collaborative transformative 
practices, needs and can be posited as a unique, specifically human realm inherently 
imbued, right at its core, with human dimensions such as relationality, social significance, 
meanings, strivings, struggles, and values.   
In a related conceptual move, TAS highlights the notion that individuals contribute to 
collaborative transformative practices (in contradistinction with and a dialectical 
expansion of the notion of participation) through their own unique deeds and their co-
authoring of historically unfolding social practices. In this vein, collaborative practices are 
posited as ontologically primary, yet they are understood to be continuously and 
cumulatively evolving through unique activist contributions by individual participants, 
who always act as social subjects, and always matter in one way or another because they 
are directly implicated in creating their realities of existence and their development, and 
thus, in social transformations of the world. This model gives full credit to collaboration 
and collectivity and, moreover, to solidarity and communion emphasized in emancipatory 
approaches such as Freire’s (e.g., 1990) critical pedagogy, reinstating the initial political 
message contained in Vygotsky’s overall orientation as well (though less pronounced in 
later works of this research school due to the pressures of the top-down regime which did 
not assign individuals with any significant role in creating their world).  
Within the transformative ontology, human beings are seen as active agents in their own 
lives and their own society, responsive and responsible – indeed answerable, in Bakhtin’s 
terms -- agents who co-create, together with other people, their world and their society 
(the Russian term созидатель [literally co-creator], with its prefix ‘co-‘ standing for 
collectivity, conveys this meaning very directly and forcefully). This portrayal challenges 
views of human beings as simply “undergoers” of solitary experiences (and the notion of 
experience as the prime ontological building block as well), or as responders to brain 
chemistry and unconscious drives and habits, or as merely participants in the world in the 
connotation of them simply dwelling and partaking of what already exists in the world in 
its status quo. 
The transformative ontology of social praxis—augmented by the notion of individual 
contributions to this praxis as its carriers and embodiments (as suggested in TAS)—can be 
seen as superseding the very distinction between collective and individual levels or 
dimensions of social practices. What is offered instead is one unitary realm or process in 
need of new terms to convey the dialectical amalgamation of the social and the individual 
-- such as the “collectividual practice.” This term suggests that individuals always act 
together in pursuit of their common goals, being inescapably bound by communal bonds 
and filaments, yet each individual acts from a unique socio-historical position (standpoint) 
and with a unique commitment (endpoint), though always coordinated and aligned with 
the social projects/practices to which this commitment contributes. In this dialectical 
approach, there is no need to get rid of an individual because there is no such a thing as an 
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individual—a solitary human being performing anything in disconnection from other 
people and outside of paramount social practices and their bonds. Instead, each individual 
human being is an ensemble of social relations (as Marx famously stated), being first 
formed within and out of these relations and then coming to embody, carry out and expand 
these social relations through one’s own deeds. To truly appreciate this point, a resolute 
break away from the dualism of the individual and the social is needed, whereby each and 
every individual human being is conceived as profoundly and deeply social—that is, as 
instantiating the common history and humanity in their vicissitudes and local expressions, 
carrying them on and bearing responsibility for their future. To see history and society 
embodied and expressed in, or even created through the deeds of each and every single 
person— albeit ultimately in the form of collective processes to which these deeds 
contribute —is a truly challenging task that still requires much attention and elaboration.  
From this perspective, development and learning are collaborative achievements of activist 
nature not confined to adapting to what is “given” in the world; instead, these processes are 
reliant upon individuals forming and carrying out their future-oriented agendas that 
contribute to collaborative projects of social transformation. These agendas centrally involve 
taking an activist stance grounded in a vision, or “endpoint,” of how community members 
believe present practices can be changed and what kind of future ought to be created. The 
key implication from this set of premises is that an individual person, who in order to be 
needs to act in the social world that is constantly changing, and moreover, that is changing 
through one’s own deeds, cannot be neutral or uncertain because such acting (unlike 
reacting, passively dwelling, or participating) presupposes knowing “which way is up” and 
what direction to go. This puts the notion of activist stance vis-à-vis the world, embodied in 
goals and commitments to social transformation, at the core of onto-epistemology of human 
development. Thus, the most critical point in TAS is that unlike in moral philosophy and in 
some neo-Marxist interpretations, the levels of individual and collective activities are 
bridged through ascertaining that each individual person, while being shaped and constituted 
by material-semiotic practices and processes and fully reliant on their resources and tools, at 
the same time profoundly matters in everything that is going on – in our collective practices, 
our communal history, and the very future that is to come. Not only does each person matter 
in collective praxis, but the way he or she matters is what constitutes development and 
allows for the formation of one’s identity which, therefore, is at once ineluctably social and 
deeply individual. Moreover, in a paradoxical way, the deepest and most authentic 
expressions of individuality are profoundly social and collaborative -- reflected in the notion 
of a person’s social mission out in the world that marks truly unique individuals (for 
examples, see Stetsenko & Arievitch, 2004).   
On this premise, activist positioning and taking a stand are the prime dimensions of 
development and learning, which are present already at the level of even presumably 
“elementary” processes, such as perception and experience, and even more fully expressed 
at levels of conceptual understandings and identity/personhood. This means that even 
‘simple’ acts of human mind are determined by goals and commitments, that is, by an 
activist striving that necessarily entails moving beyond the status quo in one’s life and 
also, simultaneously, in one’s community practices. What is at stake is the all-
encompassing centrality of activist engagement in and with the world, implicating that 
there is no way that we can extract ourselves out of this engagement. We can never take a 
neutral stance of a disinterested observer uninvolved in what is going on in the world. The 
latter point has been expressed in various ways in critical and feminist scholarship (e.g., 
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Harding, 1992; Howe, 2003; Morawski, 1994). What TAS adds to this is that we can 
never take a neutral stance of a disinterested observer uninvolved in what is going on in 
the world because what is going on in the world is a process in which we ourselves are 
directly implicated as its co-creators, through our activist contributions (if only on a small 
scale and in modest ways) that always matter and, moreover, that make up the world and 
ourselves. That is, what is added by TAS is the deep ontological grounding to legitimize 
the point about ineluctable partiality of knowing derived from considerations of the key 
dialectical principles and conditions of human and social development premised on non-
dualist ontology.  
Implications of TAS for the Human Subjectivity and the Notion 
of Future  
It is on a firm foundation of a social and communal view about human development as a 
collective process instantiated through contributions to collaborative socio-historical 
practices that the centrality of personal agency, commitment, and responsibility – and of 
all forms of human subjectivity – can be ascertained. Because human communal praxis 
enacted through individual contributions is conceptualized in TAS as the primary and 
unified ontological realm constitutive both of human development and of the social (life-
)world in which development takes place, with both co-created through praxis, this 
conceptual extension opens up ways to reveal how human subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity are incarnations of social practices – without any ontological breaks or 
gaps posited between them on the one hand, and the social praxis they stem from and 
serve, on the other. Establishing this connection is possible if we attend to the full scope of 
how a person acts as a social subject and also disclose the complexity of the ways in 
which this person’s actions contribute to the changes in the ongoing community practices 
and, thus, to their future. This account allows for a non-dualist concept of human 
subjectivity that rejects viewing it as a purely mentalist and contemplative process, such as 
implied by the notion of reflection and instead, considers it a fully legitimate dimension of 
collective and individual instantiations of social praxis. 
What substitutes for the traditional views is the notion of subjectivity in its radical 
“facticity” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002), or in its practical relevance – as a process that is 
involved and implicated in changes and transformations in collaborative practices that take 
place out in the social world understood as a forum of human deeds. Human subjectivity 
then gains its ontological status through its role and place in the ongoing social 
transformations – as contingent on and determined by how it matters in the larger realms 
of communal social life and its ongoing transformations. The practical relevance of human 
subjectivity can be ascertained by duly acknowledging the materiality of human social 
practices and their constitutive deeds – as established precisely in light of the ceaseless 
and permanent changes they incur (as they always do) in the world that itself unfolds as 
the flow of social practices and in which people and their world are interanimated.  
In other words, the phenomena of human subjectivity are revealed in their practical 
relevance, that is, in their role and their “mattering” in the totality of individual life, which 
itself is a facet of collective practices, that is, itself endowed with meaning in the light of 
individuals’ pursuits that allow (or sometimes do not allow) to contribute to these 
practices and communal forms of life. An important caveat is that individuals might not 
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always be aware of how exactly their activities contribute to the world, or they might be in 
a constant search for such activities, struggling to make sense of their lives and find “their 
way.” However, the lack of awareness and the often continuous struggle to find a 
meaningful life project (leading activity) notwithstanding, people always do contribute to 
something that goes on in the world. This is so even if these contributions are only on a 
small scale, and even if they are brought about by abstaining from activist contribution to 
these processes – because the latter type of a ‘contribution’ often works to perpetuate the 
existing status quo, to stifle changes in society and, thus, does make a difference too, 
albeit in the form of a negativity. Therefore, ultimately, what it is that the person is 
positioned by his or her activities to change in the world and oneself as a part of the 
world—what objective and what kind of the future a person contributes to—is the pivotal 
question, the answer to which is necessary in the analysis of human subjectivity that 
breaks away from, and breaks down, the Cartesian dualism. 
The type of onto-epistemology predicated on activist deeds that contribute to social 
practices and enact the future, means that the direction of our deeds (unified as one 
continuous life project) is central to forming concepts. This directions is formed by goals 
and commitments to the future enacted through contributions to collaborative projects of 
social transformation, by the stand we take vis-à-vis the world and the path we chart to 
achieve our destination. That is, what TAS highlights is the activist, forward-looking 
stance and therefore, the future, the horizon and the destination of development and 
personhood. This dimension has been under-theorized by cultural-historical theory where 
the major focus has been placed on history, and thus, on the past to the exclusion of 
questions about how the future, conceived in activist terms as a vision to which 
individuals commit, plays a formative role in development. 
The notion of activist stance bears some similarity, yet is not identical, with the notion of 
prolepsis as a "ubiquitous feature of culturally mediated thought" (Cole, 1996, p. 183) that 
draws attention to "the representation of a future act or development as being presently 
existing" (ibid.). What TAS accentuates is that rather than focusing on the representation 
of the future as being presently existing (a concept with inevitably mentalist connotations), 
human acting is contingent on individuals committing to a certain version of the future 
and, most importantly, “always already” gradually creating this future through actions in 
the present. This allows for a more direct linkage of acting in the present to how 
individuals enact the world they want to live in, and what they take as an “ought” for the 
projected futures of community practices – thus breaking the absolute barrier between the 
present and the future and highlighting the making of the future in and through the 
presently ongoing activities and actions.  
That is, prolepsis is akin to an expectation that a certain future is impending or likely, and 
thus similar to Bakhtin’s notion of addressivity – acting with an expectation of the 
response to one’s utterance in Bakhtin’s works (e.g., 1990) or to one’s action in a broader 
position such as prolepsis. In this approach, the future response, although only anticipated, 
mediates the production of the utterances and actions already in the present. The 
difference with TAS, however, is that whereas both prolepsis and addressivity are based in 
the notion that the future is imagined and anticipated, while the person is acting as if this 
future already obtains, the notion of human deeds predicated on a commitment to the 
future – as something that ought to be – is more agentive and purposive. What the notion 
of commitment suggests is that a person not so much expects or anticipates the future, but 
rather, actively works to bring this future into reality through one’s own deeds, often 
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against the odds, that is, even if a particular version of what is to come in the future is not 
anticipated as likely and instead, requires struggle and striving to achieve it. This applies 
in cases when a person struggles for one’s vision of “what ought to be” in spite of the 
powerful forces that might be pulling in other directions. In this sense, the notion of 
commitment central to TAS is closer to Nikolai N. Bernstein’s (e.g., 1966) notion of “the 
requisite future” or, (what I believe is a better translation) “the sought-after future” 
(potrebnoe budushee – [Russian]), rather than to the notions of prolepsis and addressivity.  
Bernstein (and related works by P. K. Anokhin) posited that organisms base their activity 
not only in responses to what exists in “the here and now,” but on what a person is 
anticipating and forecasting will, and also projecting what should, exist in the future.  In 
Bernstein’s (1966) words, 
We have, by all accounts, two connected processes. One of them is probabilistic 
forecasting in accordance with the perceived current situation [akin to prolepsis – AS]. . 
. . Alongside this probabilistic extrapolation of the course of surrounding events . . . 
there is the process of programming of the act that must lead to the realization of the 
sought-after [or needed, requisite– AS] future. (ibid., p. 438). 
The latter process of seeking the future and acting based on what should be and what is 
sought, can be understood as a continuing struggle to attain one’s own goals in carrying 
out goal-directed activities. Extending this notion to capture what is unique about humans 
acting as social subjects, as “collectividuals” (rather than what is characteristics of all 
living organisms, as in Bernstein and Anokhin’s works), the following specification can 
be made. The ‘sought-after future’ is the taking up of what one aspires to achieve in the 
present through acting on the premise of what ought to be created – enacted and invented 
in the present as a realization of the future to come. In this emphasis, the notion of a 
commitment to the future accentuates not so much that the future is brought into the 
present through imagination or representation, as in prolepsis, but that the future is created 
and invented in the present. The key distinction is precisely between an expectation that 
something will happen or is likely to happen in the future, while preparing oneself for it, 
versus a commitment to a future that a person believes “ought” to come and thus, acts to 
carry out in the future in efforts to bring this future into reality now, thus actively 
inventing the future – rather then merely preparing oneself for it. This conceptualization is 
derived from and itself supports the overall message central to transformative activist 
stance – about development and learning as activist projects of historical becoming at the 
intersection of individual and collective processes in the zone of proximal development 
understood as what is being created now in the form of a realization of the future in the 
present. 
Implications of TAS for Human Subjectivity: Concepts as a 
Process of Co-authoring 
Community Practices 
In the account presented in the previous sections, human subjectivity is not an independent 
module or gadget in the service of individuals’ separate and discrete goals, such as cognitive 
understanding, disconnected from the totality of individual life that itself is somehow 
disconnected from social and collective processes and practices. Instead, subjectivity is 
posited as but one dimension in the realization of the totality of the live of each social actor, or 
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their life projects —as a stepping stone in carrying out a unitary and unique (though 
dynamical and constantly changing), seamless and ceaseless (though not without 
contradictions) path of becoming a human being through making a difference in the world 
(see Stetsenko, 2010a). Within this overall “collectividual” and transformative ontology, the 
human subjectivity can be regarded as a part, or a dimension, of carrying out one’s life project 
– a path of meaningful and answerable deeds that bring forth the communal world through our 
enacting of who we want to become and what we want our world to be.  
One of the implications is that, in this sense, the development of knowledge is also, and 
simultaneously, the development of the identity and self.  The strong ties and connections 
between learning and identity have been highlighted in sociocultural scholarship, 
suggesting that learning involves the construction of identities – whereby learning creates 
identity, and identity creates learning (e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991; Nasir & Saxe, 2003; 
Wenger, 1998; Packer & Goecoechea, 2000).  Furthermore, in expanding these ideas, 
several researchers have noted that participation in community practices is not without 
tensions and costs (e.g., Hodges, 1998; Linehan & McCarthy, 2001; Packer & 
Goecoechea, 2000) and that participation should not be reduced to a process of complying 
with the normativity of community rules and roles. This line of research overlaps to some 
extent with a broader critique of overreliance in sociocultural research on processes of 
internalization and appropriation at the expense of understanding participants’ own agency 
that challenges and resists community practices (Engestrom, 1999; Holland et al., 1998; 
Stetsenko & Arievitch, 2004b; Vianna & Stetsenko, 2011).  
For example, Packer and Goicoechea (2000) have made a number of useful suggestions 
about ontological and epistemological underpinnings of sociocultural and constructivist 
theories. Their resulting proposal is for the nondualist ontology, in which it can be 
revealed how “the sociocultural perspective’s notion of learning—gaining knowledge or 
understanding— is an integral part of broader ontological changes that stem from 
participation in a community” (p. 234). Along these lines, these authors maintain that 
“learning involves becoming a member of a community, constructing knowledge at 
various levels of expertise as a participant, but also taking a stand on the culture of one's 
community in an effort to take up and overcome the estrangement and division that are 
consequences of participation” (p. 227; emphasis added). In this account, however, what 
learners take a stand on refers primarily to how community membership has positioned 
them and how they are seeking to overcome alienation. Thus, the core ontological process 
involved in identity and learning is portrayed as the learners’ striving to come to terms 
with how community practices position them, and thus concerns most of all individual 
conundrums, self-interests and feelings stemming from individual’s experiences of 
participation, including its negative aspects such as alienation, rather than a stand on the 
overall dynamics and politics of community as a social institution. That is, the ‘taking a 
stand’ notion is understood differently. Therefore, although these authors acknowledge 
that “[l]earning entails transformation both of the person and of the social world” (p. 227), 
an activist transformation of what goes on in community practices along the lines of one’s 
commitment to the future is not considered as the core, direct ontological dimension of 
both learning and identity. Thus, the ontology discussed in Packer and Goicoechea (2000) 
is primarily the ontology of individuals as persons (i.e., in the consideration of what it 
means for somebody to be), especially as they participate in communities. 
The critical specification to these lines of research offered by TAS and its onto-
epistemology of individual contributions to social practices as a unified social praxis, is 
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that the core of both identity and learning is directly connected to taking a stand by the 
learners as social actors on how their communities as social institutions need and should 
be changed for the better (not just a stand on how communities position them) – imagining 
the future worth struggling for, and making a commitment to carrying out these changes. 
Thus, learning and identity are seen as co-extensive with, and only possible through, the 
charting of a life agenda premised on a vision for social change for one’s community 
enacted through collaborative transformative practice and one’s own contribution to it (for 
details and empirical illustrations, see Vianna & Stetsenko, 2011).  In this respect, the 
transformative activist stance is akin to the critical democracy’s model of dialogic action 
(Jaramillo, 2011), tracing its roots to Marxist-Freirian critical framework that begins with 
an understanding that human existence depends on the “right and the duty to opt, to 
decide, to struggle, to be political” (Freire, 2001, p. 53).  
That is, from TAS, the key process at the interface of learning and identity has to do with 
our active engagement with events and practices, circumstances and conundrums, 
contradictions and predicaments of social practices of which we partake – and moreover, 
with these engagements in their contingency on our personal stake we claim and our 
activist stand we take in the overall dynamics and the social drama of these practices. Yet, 
these personal stake and stand are never ‘just’ personal – instead, learning and 
development coalesce when in fact we break away from concerns only about “oursleves,” 
only about how we are individually positioned, treated etc. – as if we were independent of 
others, which of course is an illusion. The meaningful stake in the events then is about an 
active – indeed activist – process of becoming which is enacted through our past, present, 
and future deeds that create the world we live in together. Thus, learning becomes truly 
personally meaningful when it is put in the service of making sense of ‘who I am’ and 
‘who I want to become’ – with these processes being contingent on and only possible 
through figuring out what I want my world to become.  
All of this implies that human beings – already by virtue of being human – always act and 
know in ways that are meaningful and that matter within their evolving life agendas and 
visions for the future tied up with the social dynamics and politics of our communities. 
That is, development is possible based on people acting as activists who cannot, nor 
should try to avoid acting and knowing from their activist positions and stands, with 
visions and commitments (and attendant emotions, feelings and passions) critically 
embodied in every act of knowing including every act of conceptual understanding. To 
expect or demand that people should be doing otherwise, for example, that they 
understand things merely intellectually, in a dispassionate, impartial or somehow 
‘objective’ way amounts to nothing less than de-humanization. Unfortunately, many 
powerful social forces, including formal education in its existant forms, act exactly in 
ways that dehumanize learners and take away their activism – by prioritizing compliance 
and adaptation to the status quo, by restricting spaces for activist engagement and denying 
the tools needed to develop and exercise it.  In these dominant educational models and 
forms, learning and knowledge are turned into a machine-like exercise of tossing facts that 
have neither human meaning, nor practical relevance and import, thus thwarting the 
development of both individuals and society.   
Returning to the current debates in CHAT, the position outlined in this paper helps to 
illuminate the role of human subjectivity as not reducible to that of merely reflecting the 
world. To use the example from Lektrosky’s work (2009) again, his take on the notion of 
reflection is captured in the following illustration. In his words, “reflection as an act of 
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individual consciousness does not necessarily change its object” (p. 86). This belies an old 
connotation that reflection is somehow separate from activity embodied in the overall 
project of becoming understood as a part and parcel of communal praxis that always 
changes its object. As Lektorsky further states, “[f]or example, when individuals reflect on 
their personality and as a result do not like themselves, it changes something in them. 
Something like an identity crisis may arise. But this does not necessarily mean that the 
personality changes” (ibid.). In this example, Lektorsky not so tacitly turns reflection into 
a process that is somehow separate from and even prior to, as well as inconsequential for, 
an active transformative engagement with the world (including oneself as its participant). 
This process of reflection, according to Lektorsky, can sometimes result in changes and 
sometimes not have transformative effects. From the TAS perspective, however, 
“reflection” (if this term is to have any currency at all) has to be conceived of as but a 
facet of a transformative engagement which only comes about if and insofar such an 
engagement – inevitably always transformative of both the person and the social world – 
already takes place. To “reflect on one’s personality” and to be dissatisfied with oneself 
not only necessarily changes the person, as in fact it always does; more importantly, 
undertaking such a “reflection” needs to be re-construed away from connotations of 
mirroring “what is” and instead, renederd an inherent dimension of doing something in the 
world, as an act that matters and makes a difference. Within this example, being 
dissatisfied with oneself does mean that the person has already embarked on a 
transformative project – because it is precisely from a position of a changed person, or at 
least a person who is struggling to change, that one’s present self might be seen, reflected 
upon, and critiqued (and found lacking in some ways). A critical reflection is only 
possible from within a changing trajectory of engaging in the world as a social actor –not 
as a separate mental “reflection.” As suggested herein, critical reflection and critical 
knowledge are forms of critical transformative activity out in the world, possible when the 
elements of a new activity path have already been created, if only in a nascent form. This 
position is in line with the Marxist logic as expressed in the deeply dialectical statement 
that “[w]hen people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact, 
that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created...” (Marx & 
Engels, 1848/1978, p. 489). 
Conclusions: Implications for Education 
In place of conclusions, it is useful to illustrate practical applications that can be derived 
from an account presented in the previous sections. These especially concern the 
principles of teaching and learning. In Davydov’s approach (e.g., 1988) as it was widely 
implemented in developing curricula and educational practices, the strategy was fully in 
line with the ‘canonical’ (cf. Sawchuk & Stetsenko, 2008) theory of human development 
including its assumptions about the nature of human subjectivity. Based in the conjecture 
that human subjectivity has to do with acquiring sociocultural experiences of humanity 
developed through the history of human practices, the strategy was to immerse students in 
socio-cultural practices stemming from the past and also to introduce students to 
knowledge as cultural tools for solving problems encountered in these practices. Thus, 
knowledge and its variegated embodiments in concepts were introduced as practical, 
valuable tools derivative of and applicable within particular socio-cultural practices, with 
meaning of concepts inherently tied up with their applicability and historically evolved 
practical relevance in these practices (for details, see Arievitch & Stetsenko, 2000). This 
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remarkable strategy afforded to efficiently close the gap between practice and theory – 
rendering concepts meaningful through revealing practices and histories ‘hidden’ behind 
them was shown to be the way to make concepts tangible and practical while at the same 
time and precisely through this strategy making them also truly theoretical. This kind of 
teaching-learning was shown to allow students to grasp the often ostensibly abstract, 
utmost theoretical concepts in utterly practical ways, that is, acquiring these seemingly 
‘merely’ theoretical concepts as de facto practical guides for action. This methodology 
followed the key principle that it is through understanding how concepts “come to be” in 
history, as tools of social practices, that these concepts can be simultaneously grasped in 
terms of how they can be put to work in practice and, precisely through this, theoretically 
understood. Theory thus was seen not as a separate way of knowing that was disconnected 
from practice but as a form of practice that encapsulates (in a generalized and abbreviated 
form) the most efficient and historically relevant ways of acting.  Moreover, one related 
teaching strategy entailed introducing knowledge to students not only as a tool that 
emerges from and makes sense within the past practices but as itself embodying activity 
and representing abbreviated templates for practice that needs to be learned through acting 
in the present (as in the “learning by doing” principle employed in constructivist 
approaches too). For example, the concept of number was introduced as a template for 
carrying out practical activities of measurement that have emerged in the history of 
civilization and that students need to actively engage with and replicate in carrying out 
their own activities in the present.  
One way to further expand this conceptualization from the transformative activist stance is 
to consider concepts in their relevance not just within the historical past and the ongoing 
present, whereby learners are introduced into practices that replicate the historical legacy 
“behind” the concepts and instructed how to carry out these practices in the “here and 
now” (see Stetsenko, 2010b). In addition – not instead! – the learners have to employ 
knowledge in its relevance for future activities that they seek, as these are envisioned by 
the learners themselves in their gradually forming meaningful pursuits of their own goals 
and visions for the future, of what ought to be. From the transformative activist stance, 
concepts, as all cultural tools too, need to be actively drawn upon and re-invented by 
learners, rather than acquired or replicated, and thus authored in the light of forming their 
own path and their own nascent life projects as these are aimed into the future, yet are 
always already launched in the present. In this case, learning and development are 
highlighted as related not only to one’s position in community practices in their past and 
present but at the same time, and centrally, to a commitment to changing these practices 
through one’s own (individual yet not a-social) goal-directed pursuits. That is, the strategy 
is to render concepts meaningful by turning them into the tools of the learners’ forming 
their life pursuits and agendas (or life projects), wherein both concepts and life projects 
begin to coalesce and co-evolve.  
In other words, teaching– learning should be organized in ways where knowledge is 
revealed: (a) as stemming out of social practice – as its constituent tools; (b) through 
social practice – where tools are rediscovered through students’ active explorations and 
inquiry; and (c) for social practice – where knowledge is rendered meaningful in light of 
its relevance within activities significant to students, that is, where concepts are turned 
into tools of their own development and their own emerging identity as social subjects 
who matter in the unfolding dynamics of collaborative practices. This position represents 
an extension of the Vygotskian approach to teaching–learning by adding emphasis on the 
Anna Stetsenko   •   24	  
	  
OUTLINES - CRITICAL PRACTICE STUDIES • Vol. 14, No. 2 • 2013 
http://www.outlines.dk 
need to establish mutual relevance between students’ identities and their knowledge, that 
is, on establishing interdependences between concepts and students’ emerging life agendas 
as a context in which these concepts are applicable in truly ‘personalized’ – that is, 
profoundly social – and thus, deeply meaningful ways. It is within this context that the 
event of understanding is uniquely possible – as the act of creating the future at the 
intersection of individual and collective agency in the ever growing and shifting zones of 
proximal development. 
To summarize the key position advanced in this paper, the resolute repudiation of the 
Cartesian dualism and its notion of isolated individuals outside of collectivities, endowed 
with solipsistic minds that parade concepts and process information within the isolated 
realm of the brain or in the “mental depths,” can be achieved while recovering and 
reclaiming individuals as social actors – co-creators of community practcies and our 
common history; and individual subjectivity as itself a fully social, embodied, material-
discursive process that gains its status through contributing to social practices and 
mattering in them (borrowing this term from Barad, 2007). This goal can only be achieved 
based in a radical re-construal of the foundational premises about not only individual and 
collective layers of social practices but the basic ontology and epistemology of these 
practices as the core of human development, social dynamics, and reality itself.  The steps 
towards such a transformative re-construal, away from the notions of adaptations, is what 
is endeavored in the transformative activist stance, in line with the core spirit of this 
approach that suggests constant renewal, innovation, and movement beyond the given. 
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